Abstract: There have been three attempts to date to establish foundations for the discipline of probability, namely the efforts of Kolmogorov (frequentist), de Finetti (Bayesian: belief and betting odds) and RT Cox (Bayesian: reasonable expectation)/ET Jaynes (Bayesian: optimal information processing). The original "proof" of the validity of the Cox-Jaynes approach has been shown to be incomplete, and attempts to date to remedy this situation are themselves not entirely satisfactory. Here we offer a new axiomatization that both rigorizes the Cox-Jaynes derivation of probability and extends it - from apparent dependence on finite additivity to (1) countable additivity and (2) the ability to simultaneously make uncountably many probability assertions in a logically-internally-consistent manner - and we discuss the implications of this work for statistical methodology and applications. This topic is sharply relevant for statistical practice, because continuous expression of uncertainty - for example, taking the set $\Theta$ of possible values of an unknown $\theta$ to be $(0,1)$, or $\mathbb{R}$, or the space of all cumulative distribution functions on $\mathbb{R}$ - is ubiquitous, but has not previously been rigorously supported under at least one popular Bayesian axiomatization of probability. The most important area of statistical methodology that our work has now justified from a Cox-Jaynes perspective is Bayesian non-parametric inference, a topic of fundamental importance in applied statistics. We present two interesting foundational findings, one of which is that Kolmogorov's probability function $\mathbb{P}_K (A)$ of the single argument A is isomorphic to a version of the Cox-Jaynes two-argument probability map $\mathbb{P}_{CJ} (A \mid B)$ in which Kolmogorov's B has been "hard-wired at the factory" to coincide with his sample space $\Omega$, thus Kolmogorov is a special case of Cox-Jaynes.